This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009) , the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest agents, which presume that there is at least one individual in society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.
Introduction
The theory of (Nash) implementation aims to reach goals in situations in which the planner does not have all the relevant necessary information, but needs to elicit it from the agents. 1 To this end, she designs a mechanism or game form in which agents will act strategically in accordance with the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. When the (Nash) equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism coincide with the goals set by the planner, these goals are implementable. A seminal paper on implementation is Maskin (1999) , who proves that a social choice correspondence (SCC ) -which summarizes the planner's goals -is (Maskin) monotonic if it is implementable; when there are at least three agents, an SCC is implementable if it is monotonic and satisfies an auxiliary condition called no-veto power; this is Maskin's Theorem. 2 Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991) , Danilov (1992) , Sjöström (1991) , and Yamato (1992) refined Maskin's characterization result by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for an SCC to be implementable. 3 A fundamental tenet of implementation theory is the consequentialism axiom. Its core idea is that the ranking of outcomes of agents should be independent of the process that generates these outcomes. An immediate implication of this axiom for implementation theory is that agents should be indifferent between a lie and a truthful statement if they result in the same material payoffs. 4 This axiom is, however, inconsistent with the mounting evidence from psychology and economics as well as from causal observations and introspection, that agents may display concern for procedures; that is, they may care about how outcomes are generated and, therefore, their ranking of outcomes may be structurally dependent on the outcome-generating process (Camerer, 2003; Sen, 1997) . Remarkably, a considerable amount of experimental data suggests that agents may display preferences for truth-telling; that is, an agent lies only when she prefers the outcome obtained from false-telling over the outcome obtained from truth-telling (Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009 ). Unexpectedly, these kinds of preferences even emerge in experiments designed to test the feasibility of classical mechanisms for implementation (Cabrales et al., 2003) . 5 The paper aims to narrow the gap between these two strands. It follows the non-consequentialist approach by accommodating concerns for truthful revelation of agents; but like mainstream theory, it keeps the idea that even these agents respond primarily to material incentives. 6 The paper refers to agents 1 Henceforth, by implementation we mean Nash implementation. 2 The first version appeared in 1977. 3 For excellent introductions to the theory of implementation, see, for instance, Jackson (2001) and Maskin and Sjöström (2002) . 4 The pioneer work in opening the theory of mechanism design to non-consequentialist considerations is that of Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) , where individuals involved in a mechanism care explicitly about the process by which their recommendations affect the social decision, as they desire to see their recommendations coincide with the social choice. 5 Following the experiment result of Cabrales et. al (2003) , the overall rate of truth-telling is 57% in a treatment with no fine. Note that in that paper, a message by agent i is defined to be truthful if she has reported the true state of the world, i.e., for instance, the true preference profiles. Such a definition does not take into account the outcome announcement as a part of agent i's truth-telling strategy. 6 In its turn, the impressive body of evidence accumulated by psychologists over the past two decades has caused scholars to study the implications of weakening other fundamental assumptions in a variety of ways, and has already turned in a number of alternatives back to the standard implementation model (for instance, Eliaz, 2002; Renou and Schlag, 2009; Bergemann et al., 2010; Cabrales and Serrano, 2010) . Noteworthy, the first paper on 'behavioral implementation theory' dates back to 1986, in which Hurwicz solves the implementation problem without positing the completeness and the transitivity of agents' preferences (Hurwicz, 1986) .
having preferences for truth-telling as being partially-honest or dishonest averse.
Its general thrust goes as follows. Assume, as an example, that the message conveyed by each agent to the planner involves the announcement of a preference profile (i.e., agents' preferences over outcomes). A message is truthful if it involves the announcement of the true preference profile. A partially-honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to announce a truthful message rather than a lie when the former (given a message announced by other agents) produces an outcome which is at least as good as the one that would be achieved if the agent lied (keeping constant the other agents' messages). Suppose that agent h is a partiallyhonest agent, who believes that the other agents will send the message m −h , and let m h be the truthful message of agent h and m 0 h be not truthful. Moreover, let both the message profile (m h , m −h ) and the message profile (m 0 h , m −h ) result in the same outcome x. Then, unlike an agent who is concerned solely with outcomes, the partially-honest agent h strictly prefers (m h , m −h ) to (m 0 h , m −h ). Put differently, the agent at issue has preferences over message profiles in which she cares about two dimensions in lexicographic order: primarily to her outcome, secondarily to her truth-telling behavior.
Seminal works on the role of honesty in implementation theory are Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009) , which show that the assumption that the planner is aware of the existence of partially-honest agents but ignores their identities drastically improves the scope of implementation. Yet, the significant impact of the presence of partially-honest agents upon implementation theory has not been fully appreciated -as described below. In line with these works, this paper also investigates implementation problems with partiallyhonest agents, where an SCC is partially-honest implementable if there is a mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes are determined with each profile of preferences over message profiles as well as potential sets of partially honest agents, and coincide with the optimal outcomes set by this SCC .
Given this setting, the paper provides, in section 3.1, a minimal set of necessary conditions for partially-honest implementation, though the above seminal works solely study sufficient conditions. Due to this result in the paper, it is possible to examine which of the SCC s cannot be partially-honestly implemented. For instance, as shown in section 4, the (strong) P areto SCC defined in abstract social choice environments is not partially-honestly implementable. Furthermore, under mild and reasonable domain restrictions of preferences and mechanisms, the paper shows that a slight strengthening of these conditions is necessary and sufficient for partially-honest implementation in more than two person societies. The set of conditions is much weaker than the necessary and sufficient condition given by Moore and Repullo (1990) for the standard implementation, and in particular it contains no variant of the Maskin monotonicity-like condition. For instance, in rationing problems when agents have singleplateaued preferences, this characterization shows that the P areto SCC is partially-honest implementable, though this SCC violates the Moore and Repullo (1990) condition, and also satisfies neither monotonicity nor no-veto power.
Note that the aforementioned theorem of this paper applies a canonical mechanism to show the sufficiency part. This type of mechanism requests agents to announce a feasible social outcome, an agent index, and moreover a profile of agents' preferences on outcomes, which is not an attractive feature, given that an important role of the mechanism is to economize on communication. Facing this issue, the paper pays attention to informational decentralization of mechanisms by considering mechanisms with strategy space reductions. While sub-section 3.2 assumes s-mechanisms (Saijo, 1988) in which the message conveyed by each agent to the planner involves the announcement of only her own and her neighbor's pref-erences -in addition to an outcome and an agent index, sub-section 3.3 endorses the idea of self-relevant mechanisms (Tatamitani, 2001) according to which each agent announces -inter alia -only her own preference. Then, the paper identifies a minimal set of necessary conditions for partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms (resp., self-relevant mechanisms); moreover, it shows that a slight strengthening of these conditions fully identifies the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s by s-mechanisms (resp., self-relevant mechanisms). Notably, these conditions respectively contain weaker variants of (Maskin) monotonicity-type conditions, each of which respectively restricts the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s by s-mechanisms and by self-relevant mechanisms. These findings have at least two immediate consequences. First, there is a trade-off between what the planner can achieve when there are partially-honest agents in the society and the strengthening of informational decentralization in mechanisms. Second, this conflict breaks down the equivalence between implementation and implementation by s-mechanism which holds in the standard framework (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2010) .
Finally, the paper turns to study partially-honest implementation problems in two-agent societies. This issue has recently been analyzed by Dutta and Sen (2009) on the assumption that agents' preferences are linear orders. Their contribution is that, even in the more problematic case of two agents, the stringent condition of monotonicity is no longer required. The paper extends their analysis to the domain of weak orders in view of its potential applications to bargaining and negotiating. The paper identifies the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s, not only in the case that the planner knows that exactly one agent is partially-honest, but also in the more subtle case that she only knows that there exist partially-honest agents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment. Section 3 reports the analysis for the many-person case, whereas Section 4 discusses briefly its implications. Section 5 reports the analysis for the two-agent case and its implications. Section 6 concludes briefly.
The implementation problem
The set of outcomes is denoted by X and the set of agents is N = {1, ..., n}. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that the cardinality of X is #X ≥ 2, while the cardinality of N is n ≥ 3. Let R (X) be the set of all possible weak orders on X.
7 Let R`⊆ R (X) be the (non-empty) set of all admissible weak orders for agent`∈ N.
8 Let R n ⊆ R 1 × ... × R n be the set of all admissible profiles of weak orders (or states). A generic element of R n is denoted by R, where its`th component is R`∈ R`,`∈ N. 9 The symmetric and asymmetric factors of any R`∈ R`are, in turn, denoted P`and I`, respectively. 10 For any R ∈ R n and any`∈ N, let R −`b e the list of elements of R for all agents except`, i.e., R −`≡ (R 1 , ..., R`− 1 , R`+ 1 , ..., R n ). Given a list R −`a nd R`∈ R`, we denote by (R −`, R`) the preference profile consisting of these R`and R −`. For any preference profile R ∈ R n and any ∅ 6 = S ⊆ N, let R −S be the 7 A weak order is a complete and transitive binary relation. A relation R on X is complete if, for all x, x 0 ∈ X, (x, x 0 ) ∈ R or (x 0 , x) ∈ R; transitive if, for all x, x 0 , x 00 ∈ X, if (x, x 0 ) ∈ R and (x 0 , x 00 ) ∈ R , then (x, x 00 ) ∈ R. 8 The weak set inclusion is denoted by ⊆, while the strict set inclusion is denoted by (. 9 (x, y) ∈ R`stands for "x is at least as good as y". 10 (x, y) ∈ P`if and only if (x, y) ∈ R`and (y, x) / ∈ R`and P`stands for "strictly better than". On the other hand, (x, y) ∈ I`if and only if (x, y) ∈ R`and (y, x) ∈ R`and I`stands for "indifferent to". list of elements of R for all agents in N\S. Given a list R −S and a list R S ∈ ×`∈ S R`, we denote by (R −S , R S ) the preference profile consisting of these R S and R −S . Let P n ⊆ R n be the set of all admissible profiles of linear orders. 11 Let L (R`, x) denote agent i's lower contour set at (R`, x) ∈ R`× X, that is, L (R`, x) ≡ {y ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ R`}. For any R`∈ Rà nd Y ⊆ X, let max R`Y be the set of optimal outcomes in Y according to R`, that is,
A social choice correspondence (SCC ) F on R n is a correspondence F : R n ³ X with ∅ 6 = F (R) ⊆ X for all R ∈ R n . Denote the class of such correspondences by
n , x ∈ F (R) holds whenever x ∈ max R`X for at least n − 1 agents; ii) unanimity if, for all R ∈ R n , x ∈ F (R) holds whenever x ∈ max R`X for all`∈ N. Given an SCC F , an outcome x is F -optimal at a preference profile R ∈ R n if x ∈ F (R). A mechanism or game form is a pair γ ≡ (M, g), where M ≡ M 1 × ... × M n , with each M i being a (non-empty) set, and g : M → X. It consists of a message space M, where Mì s the message space for agent`∈ N, and an outcome function g. Denote the admissible class of mechanisms by Γ. Let m`∈ M`denote a generic message (or strategy) for agent . A message profile is denoted by m ≡ (m 1 , ..., m n ) ∈ M. For any m ∈ M and`∈ N,
, denote by (m`, m −`) the message profile consisting of these m`and m −`. For any m ∈ M and
and m S ∈ M S , denote by (m S , m −S ) the message profile consisting of these m S and m −S .
A mechanism γ induces a class of (non-cooperative) games {(γ, R) |R ∈ R n }. Given a game (γ, R), we say that m * ∈ M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium at R if and only if, for all`∈ N,
. Given a game (γ, R), let NE (γ, R) denote the set of Nash equilibrium message profiles of (γ, R), whereas NA (γ, R) represents the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
A mechanism γ implements F in Nash equilibria, or simply implements F , if and only if F (R) = NA (γ, R) for all R ∈ R n . If such a mechanism exists, then F is (Nash)-implementable.
Given a mechanism γ, for each agent`∈ N a truth-telling correspondence
is that, given the mechanism γ and the pair (R, F ), agent`behaves truthfully at the message profile m ∈ M if and only if m`∈ T γ (R, F ). In other words, T γ (R, F ) is the set of truthful messages of agent`under the mechanism γ, when the current social state is R ∈ R n and the social goal is given by F . Note that the type of elements of M`constituting T γ (R, F ) depends on the type of mechanism γ that one may consider. For example, if the message conveyed by each agent to the planner involves the announcement of a preference profile, a feasible outcome and an agent index, and sending the truthful preference profile constitutes the relevant truthful message for each
where there is a bijection σ`:
For any`∈ N and R ∈ R n , let < R be agent`'s weak order over M under the state R. The asymmetric factor of < R is denoted Â R , while the symmetric part is denoted ∼ R . For 11 A linear order is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. A binary relation R on X is
any R ∈ R n , let < R denote the profile of weak orders over M under the state R, that is,
Definition 1. An agent h ∈ N is a partially-honest or dishonest averse agent if, for any mechanism γ, any R ∈ R n , and any m
An agent`∈ N who is a partially-honest agent is denoted by h. If agent`∈ N is not a partially-honest agent, i.e.,`6 = h, then for each game (γ, R), for all m, m 0 ∈ M: (m, m 0 ) ∈< R if and only if (g (m) , g (m 0 )) ∈ R`. Unless otherwise specified, the following informational assumption holds throughout the paper. Assumption 1. There are partially-honest agents in N. The planner is well aware of the fact that there are partially-honest agents in N but she does not know their identities.
Thus, while the planner knows that there are partially-honest agents in society and how these agents behave, the planner knows neither the identity of the partially-honest agents nor their exact number.
Let H ⊆ {H ⊆ N | H 6 = ∅} be the class of subsets of N. Note that H is considered as the potential class of partially-honest agents' groups. That is, if H ∈ H, this H is a potential group of partially-honest agents in N; in other words, H is a conceivable set of partiallyhonest agents. By Assumption 1, the planner knows that H is non-empty, and perhaps, she may know what subsets of N belong to H, but she never knows which element of H is the true set of partially-honest agents in the society. Assumption 1 implies that #H ≥ 2.
A mechanism γ induces a class of (non-cooperative) games with partially-honest agents
, we say that m * ∈ M is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with partially-honest agents at (R, H) if and only if, for all`∈ N,
represents the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
Since by Assumption 1 the planner knows that there are partially-honest agents in N but not who these agents are, this raises the question of what is an appropriate notion of implementation in such a setting. To enable the planner to partially-honestly implement SCC s, the paper amends the standard definition of implementation as follows.
In the conventional implementation theory, the objective of the planner is to design a mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes coincide with the F -optimal outcomes for each admissible state R. In contrast, in the presence of partially-honest agents, the planner, to achieve the implementability of the goal F , has to design a mechanism in which the equivalence between the set of equilibrium outcomes and the set of F -optimal outcomes holds not only for each admissible state R, but also for each conceivable set of partiallyhonest agents, i.e., for each H ∈ H. Note that the gap between the two definitions becomes closed when no agent in N is partially-honest.
To conclude, let us introduce two mild conditions imposed on the models of this paper. One is a condition on the domain of agents' preferences, while the other is a condition on the domain of mechanisms admissible in the society. The first condition basically requires that the class of available profiles of preferences is sufficiently rich. Examples of preference domains satisfying such a condition would be the set of all profiles of weak orders, linear orders, and single peaked preferences on X. Moreover, it is vacuously satisfied in the classical economic environments. Hence, our models are applicable to those environments. The condition can be stated as follows.
Rich Domain (RD): For any i ∈ N, any R ∈ R n , and any
Next, our informational assumption is that the planner knows that there exist partiallyhonest agents but ignores their identities. The partially-honest agent is an agent who prefers to be truthful if a lie is not beneficial to her. Given this structure, the existence of truthful messages is presumed since otherwise, the issue reduces to the standard implementation problem. Moreover, the admissible class of mechanisms should be constituted by those which involve a simple scheme to punish such a partially-honest agent if she sends a false message. Within this class, let us consider a type of mechanism in which, if an outcome x is F -optimal at the state R and the outcome function g selects x as the resulting outcome of the messages announced by agents, a partially-honest agent can find a truthful message which results in the same outcome x -keeping constant the messages of all other agents. In such a mechanism, any false statement by a partially-honest agent can be punished independently of the detailed information about the true state of the society. The condition on the class of admissible mechanisms Γ can be stated as follows.
Simple Punishment (SP): For any F ∈ F, for any R, R 0 ∈ R n , any x ∈ F (R), any i ∈ N, and any m ∈ M such that g (m) = x, there is m
. A mechanism γ is a mechanism with simple punishment if it satisfies SP. Denote the class of mechanisms with SP by Γ SP .
Before closing this section, it may be worth noting that the simple punishment property is satisfied by all classical mechanisms in the literature of Nash implementation (see, for instance, Repullo, 1987; Moore and Repullo, 1990; Saijo, 1988; Dutta and Sen, 1991; Tatamitani, 2001 ).
Characterization results for the many-person case
This section reports the analysis of partially-honest implementation problems in the manyperson case.
Sub-section 3.1 basically imposes no restriction on the types of admissible mechanisms except for Γ = Γ SP . First, this sub-section identifies a minimal set of necessary conditions for partially-honest implementation with no restriction on Γ. The necessary conditions include only weaker variants of the no-veto power condition. Then, by setting Γ = Γ SP , it is shown that a slight strengthening of this minimal set of necessary conditions fully identifies the class of SCC s that are partially-honest implementable -by canonical mechanisms.
The section, then, turns to study partially-honest implementation by mechanisms with strategy space reductions. While sub-section 3.2 studies partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms, sub-section 3.3 analyzes the same implementation problem by focussing on self-relevant mechanisms. For each of these two types of mechanisms, their respective sub-sections identify a minimal set of necessary conditions that an SCC F must satisfy if it is partially-honest implementable. The identified necessary conditions incorporate a Maskin monotonicity-like condition. Finally, given Γ = Γ SP , it is reported that a slight strengthening of the necessary conditions for s-mechanisms (resp., self-relevant mechanisms) fully characterizes partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms (resp., self-relevant mechanisms).
The sets of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for partially-honest implementation are more complex than those obtained by Moore and Repullo (1990) , Tatamitani (2001) , and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2010), but they are remarkably weaker and do provide additional insights; we refer the reader to Section 4 for more details.
Partially-honest implementation: A general characterization
Since Maskin's Theorem, there have been impressive advances in implementation theory. Specifically, in societies with at least three agents, Moore and Repullo (1990) established that an SCC F is implementable if and only if it satisfies Condition μ defined below.
Condition μ (for short, μ): There is a set Y ⊆ X and, for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
finally, for all R * ∈ R n , the following (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
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Condition μ(i) is equivalent to monotonicity, while Conditions μ(ii) and μ(iii) are weaker versions of no-veto power. Our first task in this sub-section is to find necessary conditions for an SCC to be partiallyhonest implementable. These conditions will not include any monotonicity-type condition, since the injection of a minimal dishonest aversion into implementation theory frees us from the jail of Maskin monotonicity (see Dutta and Sen, 2009 ). Yet, this task is particularly complicated and subtle when indifference relations are allowed. 13 To explain this aspect, suppose that an SCC F is partially-honest implementable by a mechanism γ. Let Y be the range of g:
Consider a preference profile R * ∈ R n . Suppose that some outcome y = g (m) in Y is an optimal outcome under the state R * in the set Y for all agents so as to fulfill the premises of Condition μ(iii). In the conventional theory, the message profile m constitutes an equilibrium of the game (γ, R * ). However, it may not be the case when there are partially-honest agents. For the sake of simplicity, assume that only agent h is partially-honest. Suppose that the message m h conveyed to the planner by this agent is not truthful, while a truthful statement, say m
h , m −h ) distinct from y for which she is indifferent to. Suppose that x is not maximal for one of the other agents. In this situation, we can no longer conclude that the outcome y is SCC -optimal, as the message profile m supporting y is not an equilibrium of the game
This indicates that even when y is maximal in Y under R * , not all strategies in g −1 (y) can constitute an equilibrium of g at R * when there are partially-honest agents. Among these strategies, only those in which all partially-honest agents are making truthful reports may support y as an F -optimal outcome at R * . This can be achieved by requiring that for all potential partially-honest agents (since the identities of partially-honest agents are unknown), the outcome y must be the unique optimal outcome under R * in the set Y . With this additional requirement, agent h can profitably deviate from
, but her deviation will not prevent us from concluding that y is F -optimal at R * , since the strategy profile (m 00 h , m −h ), when executed by g, results in the outcome y. The complications associated with necessary conditions are not limited to Condition μ(iii). The difficulties come mainly from two causes. First, the presence of partially-honest agents breaks down the equivalent relationship between agents' preferences over outcomes and their preferences over message profiles, which is implicitly assumed in the conventional theory. Second, conditions on F are to be formulated only in terms of preferences over outcomes. Taking these difficulties into account, we obtain the following condition, Condition μ * , which basically contains only weaker versions of Conditions μ(ii) and μ(iii).
There is a set Y ⊆ X and, for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
finally, for all H ∈ H and all R * ∈ R n , the following (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
Notice that Condition μ * (i) imposes a requirement which is met by all SCC s. The following theorem shows that Condition μ * is a minimal set of necessary conditions for the partially-honest implementation. Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. If an SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable, then it satisfies Condition μ * .
Proof. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let γ ≡ (M, g) be a mechanism which partially-honest implements
. Take any H 0 ∈ H, R ∈ R n , and x ∈ F (R). Then, there is a strategy m
n , and all x ∈ F (R). Take any (R * , H) ∈ R n ×H. As it is easy to see that F satisfies Condition μ * (i), we omit the proof here. Next, we show that F meets conditions μ * (ii)-μ * (iii). Pick any i ∈ N and suppose that y ∈ C i (R, x) ⊆ L (R * i , y), y ∈ max R * Y for all`∈ N\ {i}, and y / ∈ F (R * ). Then, as F is partially-honestly implemented by γ, it follows that y / ∈ NA ¡ γ,
for the unique partially-honest agent {i} = H. Since there cannot be any profitable deviation from (m *
for all`∈ N, and y / ∈ F (R * ). As F is partially-honestly implemented by γ, it follows that
for all`∈ N, the only agents that could profitably deviate fromm are the agents in the set H. LetH ⊆ H be the set of all partially-honest agents
for all`∈ H, we have that g (mH,m −H ) = y. Since there cannot be any profitable deviation from (mH,m −H ), we have that y ∈ NA ¡ γ, < R * ¢ for the set H, which is a contradiction. Therefore, F satisfies μ * (iii).
Note that when {{1} , {2} , . . . , {n}} ⊆ H, then μ * (iii) implies the following:
Condition μ * alone is not a sufficient condition for partially-honest implementation, but it is sufficient together with some auxiliary conditions if the domain of preferences is sufficiently rich. Such a slightly strengthened condition can be stated as follows.
Condition μ * * (for short, μ * * ): There is a set Y ⊆ X and, for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there is a profile of sets
Condition μ * and Condition μ(iii) hold; 14 finally, for all H ∈ H, and for all R * ∈ R n , the following conditions are satisfied for all i ∈ N:
Assuming that only mechanisms with simple punishment are admissible, Condition μ * * is necessary and sufficient for partially-honest implementation. Before stating our second main result, it may be instructive to briefly discuss the devised implementing mechanism.
Let γ = (g, M) be a mechanism where for each agent i ∈ N the message space is 15 Thus, each agent i announces a preference profile, R i , an outcome, x i , and an agent index, k i . Since a central ingredient of our implementation model is that there is a minimal degree of honesty among agents involved in the mechanism γ, we shall define accordingly what constitutes a honest message for γ. By endorsing the idea of Dutta and Sen (2009), a message by agent i is truthful for the mechanism γ if it discloses to the planner the true preferences of all agents involved in it. Formally, for each i ∈ N, the set of truth-telling messages is
for any state, R ∈ R n , and any societal goal, F ∈ F. Finally, let us define the outcome function g as follows. For any message profile m ∈ M,
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In words, the mechanism prescribes the following:
Rule 1 applies if agents unanimously agree on a preference profile and an outcome. As a consequence, the unanimously announced outcome, x, is the outcome of the mechanism. Rule 2 applies if all agents but one (agent i) state the same outcome and preference profile, while agent i makes a different outcome announcement or preference announcement. Then, Rule 2.1 applies if agent i disagrees with others only on the outcome announcement. In that case, the outcome of the mechanism is the outcome, x, announced by all other agents. On the other hand, Rule 2.2 applies if agent i announces a preference profile which differs from that announced by the others. In that case, the outcome of the mechanism is the x i announced by agent i, if it is an attainable outcome and not better than the outcome x for i when her true preference is equal to that announced by the other agents. Otherwise, the outcome is x. Rule 3 applies in all other cases and the outcome of the mechanism is determined by the agent who wins the "modulo game".
The above mechanism is a mechanism with simple punishment. Moreover, it is similar but not identical to the canonical mechanism used to prove the classical Maskin's Theorem. The difference is in the definition of Rule 2. While our mechanism distinguishes whether agent i announces a different preference profile or not, the canonical Rule 2 does not make this distinction. 17 Moreover, though both mechanisms satisfy the condition of simple punishment, our distinction in Rule 2 allows the planner to better exploit the fact that every partiallyhonest agent is making a truthful statement in equilibrium.
To explain this aspect, suppose that in equilibrium, the message profile falls into Rule 2.1, so that the message by agent i differs from the message reported by the others only in the outcome announcement. Then, all partially-honest agents announce truthfully the preference profile; otherwise, any of the false-telling partially-honest agents can deviate to Rule 2.2 profitably. Then, if the outcome of the mechanism is the x announced by all others, we can directly conclude that x is F -optimal at the announced preference profile. This would not be possible if the mechanism permitted the selection of
, with x i 6 = x, announced by agent i. Next, suppose that in equilibrium, the message profile falls into Rule 2.2. In this equilibrium, if H\ {i} 6 = ∅, then every h ∈ H\ {i} should send the truthful message because given m ∈ M falling into Rule 2.2, any false-telling agent h in H\ {i} can always find a truth-telling m
. By a similar argument, i should send the truthful message in this equilibrium, whenever i ∈ H.
We are now ready to state our second result of this sub-section; Condition μ * * is necessary and sufficient for partially-honest implementation when the domain of preferences is sufficiently rich and only mechanisms with simple punishment are admissible (the formal proof is relegated to Appendix).
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 and Γ = Γ SP hold, and suppose that R n satisfies RD. An SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable if and only if it satisfies Condition μ * * .
Partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms
This sub-section focuses on partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms.
The basic idea behind this mechanism is to cover each agent's preference twice. For example, agent i's preference may be covered by her own announcement and by that of another agent involved in the mechanism. A way to proceed is to arrange agents clockwise facing inward, and require that each agent`announces, inter alia, the preferences of the agent standing immediately to her left, that is, of agent`+ 1. Formally, an s-mechanism can be defined as follows.
Thus, each agent`announces her preference, R``, the preference of her neighbor, R``+ 1 , an outcome, x`, and an agent index, k`. It is important to note that the results reported in this sub-section hold as long as each agent's preference is covered twice. It is not crucial that each agent announces her own and her neighbor's preferences.
Requiring forthrightness as a regularity condition, we define partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms as follows.
Definition 4. An SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable by an s-mechanism if there exists an s-mechanism γ ≡ (M, g) such that: (i) for all R ∈ R n and all H ∈ H,
In Definition 4, it is required not only that all F -optimal outcomes coincide with partiallyhonest Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game ¡ γ, < R ¢ defined by an s-mechanism -for any state R ∈ R n and any H ∈ H -, but also that such an s-mechanism satisfies forthrightness. Forthrightness requires that if the outcome x is F -optimal at the state R and each agent announces truthfully her preference R`and her neighbor's preference R`+ 1 and announces this x, then the message profile should be a Nash equilibrium of an s-mechanism and its equilibrium outcome be the announced outcome x.
Forthrightness was originally introduced in economic environments by Dutta et al. (1995) and Saijo et al. (1996) , and it has desirable implications. A mechanism satisfying forthrightness is simple in the sense that it is easy to compute the outcome of an equilibrium message profile. Moreover, if a mechanism fails to satisfy this condition, it is subject to information smuggling; that is, the message space can be reduced to an arbitrary smaller dimensional space. Thus, any partially-honest implementable SCC by s-mechanisms would be partiallyhonest implementable by a 'further strategy space reduction mechanism' like self-relevant mechanisms (Tatamitani, 2000) , unless forthrightness is required. This indicates that there is no legitimate reason for characterizing partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms without forthrightness. Hence, to make sense of partially-honest implementation by this type of mechanism, we require the regularity condition of forthrightness in Definition 4.
Before turning to the findings of this sub-section, we discuss what constitutes a truthful message for s-mechanisms. As our objective is to examine what societal goal F can be implemented when there are agents who have a minimal dishonesty aversion, we define a message of agent`as truthful if this agent states to the planner her true preference and the true preference of her neighbor. Formally, given an s-mechanism γ = (M, g), a preference profile R ∈ R n , and a societal goal F ∈ F, the range of the truth-telling correspondence of agent`∈ N is
where n + 1 = 1.
The issue of what constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for implementation by s-mechanisms in the conventional framework has been recently addressed by Lombardi and Yoshihara (2010) , who introduce a new condition -Condition M s -, which is similar to Condition M appearing in Sjöström (1991) . This condition can be stated as follows.
Condition M s (for short, M s ): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there exists a profile of sets (C`(R`, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R`, x) ⊆ L (R`, x)∩Y for all`∈ N; finally, for all R * ∈ R n , the following (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
Notice that Condition M s differs from Condition μ only in that the set of attainable outcomes C`(R`, x) of agent`depends solely on her preference R`rather than on the entire profile R ∈ R n . In what follows, our first task is to find necessary conditions for partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms. For the same reasons highlighted in sub-section 3.1, Condition M s is too strong to constitute a necessary condition for partially-honest implementation by the type of mechanism at issue. A weaker variant of Condition M s , which is relevant for our study, can be stated as follows. * s (for short, M * s ): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there exists a profile of sets (C`(R`, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R`, x) ⊆ L (R`, x)∩Y for all`∈ N; finally, for all H ∈ H and all R * ∈ R n , the following (i)-(iii) are satisfied:
Condition M * s stands in stark contrast to Condition μ * * in including a weaker variant of the Maskin monotonicity. This weakening requires that if an outcome x is F -optimal at state R, and this outcome is not preferred less by any agent`∈ N than any other outcome in C`(R`, x) at R * , then x must be F -optimal at R * whenever the preference of any potential partially-honest agent and that of her neighbor are identical between R and R * . In contrast, Conditions M * s (ii) and M * s (iii) are weaker versions of Conditions M s (ii) and M s (iii). The next theorem shows that Condition M * s is necessary for partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms.
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. If an SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable by an s-mechanism, then it satisfies Condition M * s . Proof. Let Assumption 1 hold. Let ¦ ∈ N be an arbitrary agent index. Let γ ≡ (M, g) be an s-mechanism which partially-honest implements F ∈ F. Let Y ≡ g (M). Take any H ∈ H, any R ∈ R n , and any
As it is easy to see that F meets M * s (iii), we omit its proof here. Take any H ∈ H and any
A slight strengthening of Condition M * s is required for the sufficiency result. The two auxiliary conditions which are required are the standard Condition μ(iii) -or equivalently, Condition M s (iii) -and Condition μ * * (iv). This condition can be stated as follows. * * s (for short, M * * s ): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all H ∈ H, all R ∈ R n , and all x ∈ F (R), there exists a profile of sets (C`(R`, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R`, x) ⊆ L (R`, x) ∩ Y for all`∈ N; Condition M * s and Condition M s (iii) hold; finally, for all H ∈ H and all R * ∈ R n , Condition μ * * (iv) holds. 18 The above condition is not only sufficient when the domain of preferences is rich enough, but also necessary when only s-mechanisms with simple punishments are admissible. Before stating this result (whose proof is relegated to Appendix), it may be worthwhile describing the mechanism constructed to obtain the sufficiency part.
The implementing mechanism uses the idea of cyclic announcement of messages proposed in Saijo (1988) , and is identical to the s-mechanism used to prove that Condition M s is necessary and sufficient for implementation by s-mechanisms in the conventional framework (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2010) 
In words, a message profile is consistent with an outcome x and a preference profile R if there is no break in the cyclic announcement of preferences and all agents announce the outcome x. On the other hand, it is quasi-consistent with x and R if there are at most two consecutive breaks in the cyclic announcement of preferences, and x is unanimously announced. Finally, a message profile m is m −i consistent with x and R if agent i announces an outcome different from the outcome x announced by the others, if there are no more than two consecutive breaks in the cyclic announcement of preferences, and, finally, if these breaks (if any) happen only in the announcement of the preference made by agent i.
Define the outcome function g as follows. For any message profile m ∈ M,
The above mechanism is one with simple punishment. Before closing this sub-section, it may be worthwhile to provide the reason for why Condition M * s (i) is required to guarantee partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms. To this end, let R be the true state of the world and m be an Nash equilibrium message 18 profile of the game ¡ γ, < R ¢ which falls into Rule 1. When a canonical mechanism is employed and an equilibrium message profile falls into Rule 1 -of the mechanism described in the previous sub-section -, the preference profile R i is announced truthfully; that is, R i = R, and this permitted us to conclude in Theorem 2 that the unanimously announced outcome was F -optimal at R. This conclusion, however, is no longer possible when we are dealing with s-mechanisms. The reason is that even though all partially-honest agents are reporting truthfully, it is in general not possible to reconstruct the true state R from their reports. Therefore, Condition M * * s (i) is required to guarantee that x is F -optimal at R. To conclude, the following theorem shows that Condition M * * s is necessary and sufficient for partially-honest implementation by s-mechanisms under the same mild requirements stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Let Assumption 1 and Γ = Γ SP hold, and let R n satisfy RD. An SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable by an s-mechanism if and only if F satisfies Condition M * * s .
Partially-honest implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
From the viewpoint of informational decentralization in mechanisms, it is desirable that an agent discloses information related only to her own characteristics (Hurwicz, 1960 (Hurwicz, , 1972 . This entails analyzing partially-honest implementation by self-relevant mechanisms, which is the subject of this sub-section.
The type of self-relevant mechanism considered herein is that introduced in Tatamitani (2001). In this mechanism, each participanting agent`is required to state an outcome, x`, an agent index, k`, and only her preference, R``. Formally, it can be defined as follows.
Similar to the definition of truthfulness of the previous sub-sections, a message from each agent in a self-relevant mechanism is truthful if it conveys to the planner her true preference. Formally, given a self-relevant mechanism γ = (M, g), a preference profile R ∈ R n , and a societal goal F ∈ F, the range of the truth-telling correspondence of agent`∈ N is
Given this definition of truth-telling correspondences, partially-honest implementation by self-relevant mechanisms is defined as follows: Definition 6. An SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable by a self-relevant mechanism if there exists a self-relevant mechanism γ ≡ (M, g) such that: (i) for all R ∈ R n and all H ∈ H,
Like Tatamitani (2001), the above definition requires the regularity condition of forthrightness to avoid the problem of information smuggling. Moreover, Definition 6 requires that the planner has to design a self-relevant mechanism where only the F -optimal outcomes are realized as equilibrium outcomes of the devised game form, regardless of the current state R and who is partially honest.
Let us begin with stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation by self-relevant mechanisms in the conventional framework. To this end, additional notation is needed. For any`∈ N, any R −`∈ R n−1 , and x ∈ X, let
The necessary and sufficient condition devised by Tatamitani (2001) can be stated as follows.
Condition λ (for short, λ): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all (R, x) ∈ R n × X with D (R, x) 6 = ∅, there exists a profile of sets (C`(R −`, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R −`, x) ⊆ Λ F (R −`, x)∩Y for all`∈ D (R, x); finally, for all R * ∈ R n , the following (i)-(iv) are satisfied:
Condition λ is markedly stronger than Condition μ. Notable parts of Condition λ are Condition λ(i) and Condition λ(iv). Condition λ(i) is much stronger than Maskin monotonicity.
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For the same reasons highlighted in sub-section 3.1, the participation of dishonest averse agents in a self-relevant mechanism makes Condition λ no longer a necessary condition for implementation. A weakening of Condition λ which is relevant for the present study can be stated as follows.
Condition λ * (for short, λ * ): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all (R, x) ∈ R n × X with D (R, x) 6 = ∅, there exists a profile of sets (C`(R −`, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R −`, x) ⊆ Λ F (R −`, x) ∩ Y for all`∈ D (R, x); finally, for all H ∈ H and all R * ∈ R n , the following (i)-(iv) are satisfied:
for all`∈ N , and x / ∈ F (R * ), then there exists
, then R h 6 = R * h for some h ∈ H. It is important to note that Condition λ * incorporates not only a monotonicity-type condition but also a punishment-type condition, Condition λ * (iv). 19 See Tatamitani Though Condition λ * is weaker than Condition λ, these two conditions are very similar. Nonetheless, the next theorem shows that the proposed amendment of Condition λ is a necessary condition for partially-honest implementation by self-relevant mechanisms.
Theorem 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. If an SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable by a self-relevant mechanism, then it satisfies Condition λ * .
Proof. Let Assumption 1 hold and ¦ ∈ N be an arbitrary agent index. Let γ ≡ (M, g) be a self-relevant mechanism which partially-honest implements F ∈ F. Let Y ≡ g (M). Take any H ∈ H and any (R,
or any H ∈ H, and g (m
x). Since it holds for any R
. Note that the proofs that F meets Conditions λ * (i)-λ * (iii) can be obtained by following a reasoning similar to that used in Theorem 3, so we omit them here. Finally, we show that F satisfies Condition λ * (iv).
Condition λ * alone does not guarantee the sufficiency of partially-honest implementation by self-relevant mechanisms. As a necessary and sufficient condition, it needs a slight strengthening of Condition λ * by adding the two auxiliary conditions, Condition μ(iii) and Condition μ * * (iv). Thus, the new condition as a whole is stated below.
Condition λ * * (for short, λ * * ): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all (R, x) ∈ R n × X with D (R, x) 6 = ∅, there exists a profile of sets (C`(R −`, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R −`, x) ⊆ Λ F (R −`, x) ∩ Y for all`∈ D (R, x); Condition λ * and Condition μ(iii) hold; finally, for all H ∈ H and all R * ∈ R n , Condition μ * * (iv) holds. 20 Theorem 6. Let Assumption 1 and Γ = Γ SP hold, and let R n satisfy RD. An SCC F ∈ F is partially-honest implementable by a self-relevant mechanism if and only if it satisfies Condition λ * * .
Implications
This section briefly discusses the implications of the results reported in section 3. Before going into the details, let us note that we cannot specify in advance the strucutre of the set H in which the analysis takes place. By our assumption, H could be anything whenever H ⊆ 2 N \∅ and #H = 2 hold. However, when we examine the performance of each SCC in terms of its partially-honest implementability, it seems most plausible to proceed with this examination by assuming H = 2 N \∅. This is because such an assumption 20 Henceforth, Condition μ(iii) and Condition μ * * (iv) are referred to as Condition λ * * (iii) and Condition λ * * (iv), respectively. Moreover, we refer to the statement that requires only one of the statements (i)-(ii) in Condition λ * as Conditions λ * * (i)-λ * * (ii).
implies the severest situation for the planner in the sense that she cannot know even the class of potential sets of partially-honest agents, and so she cannot help but simply presume H = 2 N \∅, and then design a mechanism which can implement her goal, F , even in this situation. Indeed, by covering the case that H = 2 N \∅, the planner is ensured of the implementability of F for any other specialization that the set H may take. For this reason, we turn to analyze some implications of the aforementioned theorems under the specification that the structure of H is H = 2 N \∅. The first proposition is an impossibility, showing that Condition μ * imposes non-trivial restrictions on the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s. To show this result, let us define the Pareto SCC. For each R ∈ R n , the Pareto set, P O (R), is:
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P O (R) ≡ {x ∈ X|@y ∈ X: (y, x) ∈ R i for all i ∈ N and (y, x) ∈ P i for some i ∈ N} .
An SCC F on R n is the Pareto SCC, denote F P O , if F (R) = P O (R) for all R ∈ R n . Our next result shows that this SCC violates Condition μ * .
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that F P O satisfies Condition μ * * . Let N = {1, 2, 3} with #N = 3, X = {x, y, z} with #X = 3, and R 3 = {R, R * }, where agents' preferences are as follows:
R R * 1 2 3 1 2 3 x y z x x,y x,y y z x y z z z x y z where, as usual, x y means that the agent in question strictly prefers x to y, while x, y means that the agent at issue is indifferent between x and y.
As y ∈ P O (R), there exists a profile (C`(R, y))`∈ N such that y ∈ C`(R, y) ⊆ L (R`, y)∩Y for all`∈ N. Since P O (R) = X, it follows that Y = X. Notice that Condition μ * (ii.a) is vacuously satisfied if H = {i} ⊆ {2, 3}. Then, let H = {1}. Observe y ∈ max R * X for all`∈ {2, 3} and
The next proposition is a possibility result, showing that while the Pareto SCC, F P O , defined on the domain of single-plateaued preferences violates both Condition μ(i) and Condition μ(ii), it is partially-honest implementable by virtue of Theorem 2. Before proving this result, let us define the environment in which the result is formulated.
Let M ∈ R ++ be an amount of some infinitely divisible commodity which has to be allocated among a set of agents N , with n ≥ 3. An allocation is a list x ∈ R n + such that P x`= M. 22 Let X ≡ © x ∈ R n + | P x`= M ª be the set of feasible allocations. Each agent`∈ N is equipped with a continuous and single-plateaued preference relation Rd efined on X as follows: there exists a continuous and quasi-concave real-valued function
For each ∈ N, the preference relation R`defined on X is called single-plateaued when there exist 21 Henceforth, the symbol @ denotes the negation of the the existence quantifier, ∃. 22 When its bounds are not explicitly indicated, a summation should be understood to cover all agents. two numbersx`, x`∈ [0, M] such that x`≤x`and for all x`, y`∈ [0, M]: (i) if x`< y`≤ xò r x`> y`≥x`, then (y 0 , x 0 ) ∈ P`for any x 0 , y 0 ∈ X, with x 0`= x`and y 0 = y`; (ii) if x`, y`∈ [x`,x`], then (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ I`for any x 0 , y 0 ∈ X, with x 0`= x`and y 0 = y`. The interval p (R`) ≡ [x`,x`] is the plateau of R`, where x is the left end-point of the plateau of R`, andx is the right end-point. LetR`be the class of all such preference relations for each agent`∈ N. Note that by definition of R`∈R`, it follows that R`is single-peaked if x`=x`. Given x`∈ [0, M], let r`(x`) be the consumption bundle on the other side of agent`'s plateau amounts that she finds indifferent to x`if such consumption exists, and the end-point of [0, M] on the other side of her plateau amounts otherwise. Given a profile of preferences R ∈R n , p (R) ≡ (p (R 1 ) , ..., p (R n )) denotes its associated profile of plateau amounts.
We are now in a position to establish our possibility result.
Proposition 2. Let F P O onR n be the Pareto SCC. Then, (i) F P O satisfies neither of Conditions μ(i) and μ(ii); (ii) given Assumption 1, F P O satisfies Condition μ * * .
Proof. Let F P O onR n be the Pareto SCC. We illustrate part (i) by considering the following the three-agent example. 23 Let M = 1, N ≡ {1, 2, 3}, with #N = 3, and R, R * ∈R n be such that
, 0
To show part (ii), let (R, x,`) ∈R n × X × N with x ∈ F P O (R), and let C`(R, x) ≡ L (R`, x). Also, X = Y as F P O satisfies unanimity. We will show that F P O satisfies Condition μ * * under these specifications. Pick any arbitrary (R, R * , x) ∈R n ×R n × X, with x ∈ F P O (R). Condition μ * * (i) is always vacuously satisfied. Moreover, F P O meets Condition μ * * (iii). Next, we show that F P O satisfies μ * * (ii) and μ * * (iv).
Let H = {i} and y / ∈ F P O (R * ). We show that {y} 6 = max R * i C i (R, x). As y / ∈ F P O (R * ), it follows that there exists an allocation z ∈ X such that (z, y) ∈ R * j for all j ∈ N and (z, y) ∈ P * j for some j ∈ N. As y ∈ max R * X for all`∈ N\ {i}, it follows that (z, y) ∈ P * i and (z, y)
i . Then, y is not a plateau amount for agent i, and so L (R * i , y) 6 = X. Let y 0 ≡ (y i , w −i ) 6 = y where w −i ∈ R n−1 + such that P`∈ N\{i} w`= P`∈ N\{i} y`. The allocation y 0 exists and belongs to the set L (R i , x) as (x, y) ∈ R i and (y, y 0 ) ∈ I i . As y 0 ∈ L (R i , x) \ {y} and (y, y 0 ) ∈ I * i , we have that {y} 6 = max R * i C i (R, x). Hence, F P O satisfies Condition μ * * (ii.a). Let i ∈ H and #H > 1. Assume that R * = R and {y} = max R * i C i (R, x). Thus, x = y. and so y ∈ F P O (R * ). Therefore, F P O satisfies Condition μ * * (ii.b).
Let i / ∈ H and R * = R. It follows that (y, x) ∈ I i and (y, x) ∈ I`for all`∈ N\ {i}. Suppose that y / ∈ F P O (R). Then, there exists a z ∈ X such that (z, y) ∈ R k for all k ∈ N and (z, y) ∈ P j for some j ∈ N. By transitivity of R j for all j ∈ N, it follows that z Pareto dominates x under the state R. Then, x / ∈ F P O (R), a contradiction. Therefore,
. Assume, to the contrary, that x / ∈ F P O (R * ). Then, there exists an allocation z ∈ X such that (z, x) ∈ R * k for all k ∈ N and (z, x) ∈ P * j for some j ∈ N. As x ∈ max R * X for all ∈ N\ {i}, it follows that (z, x) ∈ P * i and (z, x) ∈ I * for all`∈ N\ {i}; and (z, x) ∈ I`for all`∈ N\ {i} as
In their seminal paper, Dutta and Sen (2009) showed that the only requirement of no-veto power is sufficient for partially-honest implementation. The above finding shows that the scope of implementation is further enlarged to include many SCC s which are non-monotonic and violate the auxiliary condition of no-veto power. The last objective of this section is to investigate how the monotonicity-type condition incorporated in Condition M * * s affects partially-honest implementability. The analysis reveals that this condition is restrictive, though it is weaker than Maskin monotonicity. Remarkably, it shows that the equivalent relationship between implementation and implementation by s-mechanisms holding in the classical implementation framework no longer holds when there exist agents who are dishonest averse.
To this end, let us turn to define the environment in which the analysis is carried out. Let X be a finite set of outcomes. For any x, y ∈ X, with x 6 = y, and R ∈ P n , let N R (x, y) ≡ {i ∈ N| (x, y) ∈ R i }. 24 Let us denote (x, y) ∈ T R if and only if #N R (x, y) ≥ #N R (y, x), which implies that x is majority preferred to y at the profile R. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that n is an odd number so that the majority relation T R on X is a tournament for any R ∈ P n . 25 The set of all top-cycle outcomes at state R ∈ P n can be defined as follows:
An SCC F T C on P n is the top-cycle SCC if for all R ∈ P n , F T C (R) = T C (R). The next proposition shows that F T C is partially-honest implementable, while it cannot be partially-honest implemented by any s-mechanism.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold and H
T C is not partially-honest implementable by any s-mechanism.
Proof. Observe that Condition μ * * (i) is vacuously satisfied by any SCC. Then, to see that F T C is partially-honest implementable, it suffices to observe that F T C satisfies the requirement of no-veto power which, in turn, implies Conditions μ * * (ii)-μ * * (iv). This completes part (i) of the statement.
To show part (ii), assume, to the contrary, that F T C is partially-honest implementable by an s-mechanism. Then, F T C satisfies Condition M * s , and, in particular, Condition M * s (i). 24 P n ⊆ R n is the set of all available profiles of linear orders. 25 A relation T on X is a tournament if it is complete and asymmetric.
Let N = {1, 2, 3} with #N = 3, X = {x, y, z}, with #X = 3, and R 3 = {R, R * }, where agents' preferences are as follows:
x y z x y x y z x y z z z x y z x y
With abuse of notation, we write xT R y for (x, y) ∈ T R . In terms of the tournament relation, we have that xT R yT R zT R x, while xT R * a for all a ∈ {y, z} and yT R * z. Since y ∈ T C (R) = X, there exists a profile of sets
The only case that we are left to verify is H = {1}.
Before closing this section, it is important to note that the Walrasian correspondence and the egalitarian-equivalent solution (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) , defined in the classical exchange economies, are other well-known examples of non-monotonic SCC s. These SCC s are not partially-honest implementable by any s-mechanism either, though they are partiallyhonest implementable by virtue of Theorem 2.
Two-agent implementation problems
Seminal papers on two-agent implementation are those of Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991) , who independently refined Maskin's characterization result (Maskin, 1999) by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for an SCC to be implementable. 26 Since Dutta and Sen's Condition β and Moore and Repullo's Condition μ2 coincide in substance, we state only Condition μ2.
Condition μ2 (for short, μ2): There exists a set Y ⊆ X and, for all R ∈ R n and all x ∈ F (R), there exists a profile of sets (C`(R, x))`∈ N such that x ∈ C`(R, x) ⊆ L (R`, x) ∩ Y for all`∈ N; furthermore, Condition μ holds; finally, for all R * ∈ R n , the following (iv) is satisfied:
Condition μ2 is markedly stronger than Condition μ, as it includes a punishment conditionCondition μ2(iv). While the first part of Condition μ2(iv) guarantees the existence of a punishment outcome, the second part requires that if the punishment outcome is an equilibrium outcome, it should be F -optimal.
In the next two sub-sections, we identify the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s, not only in the case where the planner knows that exactly one agent is partiallyhonest, but also in the case where the exact number of partially-honest agents is unknown to her -Assumption 1. We present two new conditions which are not only necessary and sufficient conditions for SCC s to be partially-honest implementable, but also markedly weaker than Condition μ2. Significantly -and in line with earlier results and Theorem 2 -, our characterizations confirm that when agents hold preferences for truth-telling, the scope of implementation is enlarged. Yet, limits still remain. Particularly, what still limits implementability are the weaker variants of Condition μ2(v) embedded in our conditions on implementation. Sub-section 5.3 reports briefly the implications of our results.
Exactly one partially-honest agent
In this sub-section, we make the informational assumption that there exists exactly one partially-honest agent in society. The planner knows that there exists a dishonest averse agent but not who she is.
For the same reason highlighted in sub-section 3.1, Condition μ2 is not a necessary condition for partially-honest implementation. We amend this condition in the following way.
Condition μ2
* (for short, μ2 * ): Conditions μ * holds; moreover, for all H ∈ H, and for all R * ∈ R 2 , the following condition (iv) is satisfied:
2 , e), and
In the next theorem, we show that the above Condition μ2 * is necessary for implementation when exactly one agent holds preferences for truth-telling.
Theorem 7. Let Assumption 1 hold and H
is partially-honest implementable, then it satisfies Condition μ2 * .
Proof. Let Assumption 1 hold and let H = {{1} , {2}}. Let γ ≡ (M, g) be a mechanism which partially-honest implements F ∈ F, which is defined on R 2 . The proof that F satisfies Condition μ * follows from Theorem 1. Finally, we show that F meets Condition μ2 * (iv). Take any H ∈ H. Take any
holds, as sought. Finally, it is also clear that F satisfies Condition μ2 * (iv.b) as, for instance, in the case of μ2 * (iv.b.1), if e / ∈ F (R * ), then the only deviator is the partially-honest agent 1, but her deviation to an m *
, which is a contradiction. Thus, F satisfies μ2 * (iv).
Though Condition μ2 * is a necessary condition for partially-honest implementation, it is too weak to guarantee the sufficiency result. To this end, other requirements exist. These requirements are that the domain of preferences must be large enough, and that F satisfies Condition μ * * and an extra auxiliary condition. The condition as a whole can be stated as follows.
Condition μ2
* * (for short, μ2 * * ): Condition μ * * holds; 27 moreover, for all H ∈ H, and for 27 We refer to the condition that requires only one of the statements (i)-(iv) in Condition μ * * as Conditions μ2
all R * ∈ R 2 , the following condition (v) is satisfied:
, and e / ∈ F (R * ), then;
, and (e, x) ∈ I * 2 , then e ∈ F (R * ).
The next theorem shows that this condition is not only sufficient, but also necessary for partially-honest implementation, when only game forms with simple punishment are admissible (the formal proof is relegated to Appendix).
Theorem 8. Let Assumption 1, Γ = Γ SP , and RD hold, and let H = {{1} , {2}}. An SCC F ∈ F defined on R 2 is partially-honest implementable if and only if it satisfies Condition μ2 * * .
There are partially-honest agents
This sub-section makes the informational assumption that the planner knows that there are partially-honest agents, but she knows neither their identities nor their exact number. Its objective is to fully identify the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s under this informational assumption. To this end, as done in the previous sub-section, let us lay down the condition that every SCC F must meet if it is partially-honest implementable. The condition can be stated as follows.
Condition μ2
• (for short, μ2
• ): Condition μ2 * holds; moreover, for all R * ∈ R 2 , the following condition (v) is satisfied:
, and y ∈ max R * Y for all`∈ N\ {i}, then y ∈ F (R * ) whenever x = y.
It is easy to confirm that Condition μ2
• (v) is necessary. By virtue of Theorem 7, the next theorem states that Condition μ2
• is necessary for partially-honest implementation, while omitting the proof of it.
Theorem 9. Let Assumption 1. If an SCC F ∈ F defined on R 2 is partially-honest implementable, then it satisfies Condition μ2
• .
Condition μ2
• alone does not suffice to guarantee partial-honest implementation. Let us strengthen it as follows.
•• (for short, μ2 •• ): Condition μ2 * * holds; 28 moreover, for all R, R * ∈ R 2 , the following condition (vi) is satisfied:
, and y ∈ max R * Y for all`∈ N\ {i}, then y ∈ F (R * ).
This condition guarantees the sufficiency result when the domain of preferences is sufficiently rich. However, to close the gap between what constitutes a necessary and a sufficient condition, we focus on game forms which satisfy the following stronger variant of punishment condition. 28 We refer to the condition that requires only one of the statements (i)-(v) in Condition μ2 * * as Conditions μ2
Strong
. A mechanism γ is a mechanism with strong punishment if it satisfies StP. Denote the class of mechanisms satisfying StP by Γ StP .
The above condition has a similar flavor to SP. However, with condition StP, the planner is required to design a game form in which if x is an attainable outcome at state R -in the sense that there is a message profile m leading to it under this state -, then an agent i should be able to reach this x by replacing the untruthful message m i with a truthful one m 0 i (while keeping constant the messages of all others). Therefore, differently from SP, every attainable outcome can be supported by a truthful message profile, regardless of whether it is an F -optimal outcome. In this sense, the above condition can be considered a strong punishment requirement. Similar to SP, the requirement of StP is satisfied by all classical mechanisms in the literature of Nash implementation (see, for instance, Repullo, 1987; Moore and Repullo, 1990; Saijo, 1988; Dutta and Sen, 1991; Tatamitani, 2001 ).
The following theorem shows that Condition μ2 •• is necessary and sufficient for partiallyhonest implementation, when the domain of preferences is sufficiently rich and the focus is on mechanisms with strong punishment (the formal proof is relegated to Appendix). Before closing this sub-section, it may be worth mentioning briefly that if the planner knows that both agents are partially-honest, the class of partially-honest implementable SCC s becomes larger, since neither Condition μ2 * * (ii), Condition μ2 * * (iv), nor Condition μ2 * * (v.b) is required. This result is readily obtained by Theorem 10. Notice that the above result does not postulate any requirement on the domain of preferences.
Implications
Condition μ2
•• -and so Condition μ2 * * -imposes non-trivial restrictions on F . For example, the Pareto SCC is not partially-honest implementable by virtue of Proposition 1. Despite this, the results of the above sub-sections are quite permissive. 29 In the following, we justify this assertion by considering economically meaningful assumptions on the domain of preferences and on the set of outcomes.
There are economic environments in which the following assumption is satisfied.
Assumption 2 (Moore and Repullo, 1990, p. 1093). There exists a bad outcome b ∈ X such that for all R ∈ R 2 and i ∈ N, (x, b)
For example, consider an exchange economy in which agents have strongly monotonic preferences and the SCC assigns only positive consumption bundles. Under free disposal, one can define the null consumption bundle as the bad outcome. If there is a bad outcome, we can set e (x, R,
Moreover, though Condition μ2 •• can be checked by using the algorithm provided by Sjöström (1991) , a condition which can be promptly checked is stated below.
Restricted veto power (Moore and Repullo, 1990, p. 1093): For all i ∈ N, all R ∈ R 2 , all x ∈ X, and all x 0 ∈ F (R 2 ) ≡ {y ∈ X|y ∈ F (R) for some R ∈ R 2 }, if x ∈ max R`X for all`∈ N\ {i} and (x, x 0 ) ∈ R i , then x ∈ F (R) holds.
The next result shows that the condition of restricted veto power suffices to guarantee partially-honest implementation when Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Corollary 4. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. An SCC F on R 2 is partiallyhonest implementable if it satisfies restricted veto power.
Proof. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Suppose that F on R 2 satisfies restricted veto power. It suffices to show that Assumption 2 and restricted veto power imply Condition μ2
•• . Let Y = X, and for all R ∈ R 2 and all x ∈ F (R), let
By Corollary 3, an SCC is partially-honest implementable by Condition μ2
if the planner knows that both agents are partiallyhonest. Under this informational assumption, unanimity and a weakening of restricted veto power, when combined with Assumption 2, suffice to guarantee partially-honest implementation. 30 The weakening of restricted veto power can be stated as follows.
Weak restricted veto power: For all i ∈ N, all R ∈ R 2 , all x ∈ X, and all x 0 ∈ F (R), if x ∈ max R`X for all`∈ N\ {i} and (x, x 0 ) ∈ R i , then x ∈ F (R) holds.
We can now state the following result.
Corollary 5. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, and let H = {N}. An SCC F on R 2 is partially-honest implementable if it satisfies weak restricted veto power and unanimity.
Proof. It is obvious, so omitted.
Suppose that two agents bargain over the division of one unit of a perfectly divisible good. If they do not reach an agreement, they both receive nothing. In this framework, nonmonotonic strongly individual-rational bargaining solutions 31 defined on the class of utility possibility sets -such as the Nash bargaining solution -are special examples of SCC s applied to Corollary 4 and Corollary 5, setting the disagreement point d = (0, 0) as a bad outcome. 32 30 For the definition of unanimous SCCs, see section 2. 31 A bargaining solution is strongly individual-rational if it provides agents with agreements which give them utilities higher than those they derive from the disagreement point d. 32 For the Nash bargaining solution defined on the class of utility possibility sets, see Vartiainen (2007) .
Finally, let us consider an interesting domain restriction. Before defining it, let SL (R i , x) denote agent i's strict lower contour set at (R i , x) ∈ R i × X; that is, SL (R i , x) ≡ {y ∈ X| (x, y) ∈ P i }. The assumption on the domain of preferences can be defined as follows.
Assumption 3 (Busetto and Codognato, 2009). R
2 is such that for all R * ∈ R 2 , we have:
This domain restriction is very mild and much weaker than Assumption E imposed by Moore and Repullo (1990, p. 1095 ) and Assumptions 5.1-5.2 imposed by Dutta and Sen (1991, p. 125) , whenever X is a subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. 33 For example, this restriction is satisfied in environments with continuous and locally non-satiated preferences or in environments in which the set of outcomes is a space of lotteries over a finite set of outcomes and agents' preferences over lotteries are represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Given Assumption 3, we can define a condition that, when combined with others, suffices to ensure Condition μ2
•• .
Definition 7. An SCC F on R 2 satisfies the non-empty lower intersection if for all
This property appears in Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991) and holds in many environments. For example, it holds in an exchange economy for which indifference curves never touch the axes, and for which the SCC recommends only interior allocations. We can now state our last two results.
Corollary 6. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 hold. An SCC F on R 2 is partiallyhonest implementable if it satisfies non-empty lower intersection and restricted veto power.
Proof. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 hold. Suppose that F on R 2 satisfies nonempty lower intersection, weak restricted veto power, and unanimity. We show that F is partially-honest implementable. It suffices to show that Condition μ2
•• is implied by our suppositions.
For all i ∈ N, all (x, R) ∈ X × R 2 , and all x ∈ F (R), let C i (R, x) = SL (R i , x) ∪ {x} and Y = X. It is easy to verify that
By definition of e (x 0 , R 0 , x, R) and non-empty lower intersection, it is easy to see that Condition μ2
•• (v.a) is satisfied, while Condition μ2
, and y ∈ max R * Y for i,`∈ N with i 6 =`. It cannot be that y ∈ C i (R, x) \ {x}; otherwise,
•• (vi) is satisfied, trivially. Moreover, since restricted veto power implies that x ∈ F (R * ), it follows that Condition μ2
•• (ii) and Condition μ2 •• (iv) are satisfied. Clearly, restricted veto power implies Condition μ2
•• (iii). The statement follows by observing that Condition μ2
Corollary 7. Let Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 hold, and let H = {N}. An SCC F on R 2 is partially-honest implementable if it satisfies non-empty lower intersection and unanimity.
Proof. The proof of this statement directly follows from the proof of Corollary 6, and so it is omitted here.
Consider a two-agent exchange economy with`≥ 2 divisible goods, in which agents have continuous and strongly monotonic preferences, and in which indifference curves never touch the axes (for instance, Cobb-Douglas preferences). Suppose that an SCC F selects only interior allocations of the feasible set. In this setting, restricted veto power, unanimity, and non-empty lower intersection are satisfied by this F . The Walrasian correspondence and the egalitarian-equivalent solution are examples of such SCC s. 34 This implies that they are partially-honest implementable, according to Corollary 6 and Corollary 7.
Concluding remarks
In this closing section, rather than restating the main contributions of the paper, we conclude with a word of caution and with a couple of alleys for research.
In the framework developed by Moore and Repullo (1990) , this paper has studied the consequences of injecting a minimal dishonesty aversion in implementation theory. While it is undeniable that there are people who care not only about welfaristic features of the consequences, but also -to some extent -non-consequential features of lying, it is equally undeniable that it would be a mistake to apply the kind of aversion studied here carelessly. Caution seems advisable in all applied fields in which the idea of partial-honesty may not be appealing or plausible, like in the playground of auction design. Nonetheless, this idea can be fruitfully applied to a wide range of public decision making problems. Applications to problems of public goods provision, externalities, voting, taxation, and income distribution seem to hold exciting potential. The tools developed and the results reported herein can provide useful arguments and insights in this respect.
Second, while the paper has focussed on a minimal aversion to lying by agents involved in a mechanism, the departure from the standard assumption that agents are unconcerned about the non-welfaristic features of the consequences can be modelled in a variety of ways. An interesting direction has been taken up in a recent work by Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011b) , where the authors explore the consequences of injecting a 'stronger' degree of honesty in implementation problems by also connecting the outcome announcement with the deception. It is certainly worth considering other views on modelling agents' preferences.
Third, while a considerable amount of experimental data suggests that agents may display preferences for truth-telling, all lab experiments designed to test whether or not agents consider more than "just" their material payoffs in strategic situations are not geared towards implementation theory. There is little evidence that experimental subjects are willing to uphold the truth when called to perform implementation tasks if consequences of doing so are not costly -e.g., Cabrales et al. (2003) . The design of experimental tests for dishonesty aversion specifically tailored towards implementation theory is highly desirable and promise to be a fruitful and interesting area of research for years to come.
Finally, while the paper sets solid foundations for implementation with partially-honest agents, it falls short in many important aspects. For example, while the paper specified the set of properties that an SCC should satisfy in order to be partially-honest implementable, the devised mechanisms present the disadvantage of involving complex strategy spaces. In particular, strategies include either whole preference profiles or whole indifference sets of several agents. This implies that the message space is of infinite dimension in many economic applications. Furthermore, the components of the strategy space do not have a straightforward economic interpretation such as consumption bundles, allocations, and prices. Therefore, there is a need for specifying the scope of the analysis reported herein away from abstract social choice environments. In this regard, the exploration of the rich set of implications that arise from the injection of a minimal dishonesty aversion to economic agents involved in a mechanism can take many directions. One interesting direction is explored in a recent work of Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011a) in which implementation of efficient SCC s by natural mechanisms is analyzed in classical exchange economies and results in line with those reported herein are unveiled.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and let R n satisfy RD. Take any F ∈ F. Let ¦ ∈ N be an arbitrary agent index. 1. The necessity of Condition μ * * . Let F be partially-honest implemented by γ ≡ (M, g) ∈ Γ SP . Let Y ≡ g (M). Take any R ∈ R n and any x ∈ F (R). Then, there exists an m (R, x) ∈ NE ¡ γ, < R ¢ for any H 0 ∈ H, such that g (m (R, x)) = x and m h (R, x) ∈ T γ h (R, F ) for any h ∈ H 0 and any
Take any R * ∈ R n and any H ∈ H. By Theorem 1, it follows that F satisfies Condition μ * . Thus, we only show that F satisfies μ * * (ii.c)-μ * * (iv).
Since R n satisfies RD, such a profile is admissible. Condition μ * (iii) implies that y ∈ F ¡R¢ , given that F satisfies Condition μ * . Suppose that there exists a non-empty set S ⊆ N such thatm`/ ∈ T γ (R * , F ) for all`∈ S; otherwise g (m) ∈ F (R * ), as sought. Then, by SP, for each`∈ S, there exists anm F ) . Assume, to the contrary, that H = {i}. Then, the only deviator is agent i. Since γ satisfies SP, there exists an m *
2. The sufficiency of Condition μ * * . Suppose that F satisfies Condition μ * * . Let γ ≡ (M, g) be the mechanism defined in sub-section 3.1. For each`∈ N, the set of truthful message is that defined in (1). By construction, γ ∈ Γ SP . Take any R ∈ R n . To show that F (R) ⊆ NA ¡ γ, < R ¢ for any H ∈ H, let x ∈ F (R) and suppose that, for all`∈ N, m`= (R, x, ¦) ∈ T γ (R, F ). Rule 1 implies that g (m) = x. Suppose that ∈ N deviates from m`to m * ∈ M`. It follows from Rules 2 that
with g (m) = x for this H, and let us consider the following cases.
Case 1 : m corresponds to Rule 1.
h , a contradiction. Otherwise, R =R and so x ∈ F (R). Then,
for all h ∈ H\ {i}. Suppose that #H > 1 and i ∈ H. As m h ∈ T γ h (R, F ) for all h ∈ H\ {i}, it follows that R =R and x ∈ F (R). Since m falls into Rule 2.2, it follows that R i 6 = R, so that
Otherwise, let H = {i}. Observe that R 6 =R = R`for all ∈ N\ {i}; otherwise agent i can induce Rule 1 by deviating to a suitable truthful message and obtain a profitable deviation. Notice that m i ∈ T γ i (R, F ), otherwise agent i can induce Rule 2.2 by deviating to an m
Since F satisfies μ * * , there exists a profile
Case 4 : m corresponds to Rule 3.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let Assumption 1 hold and let R n satisfy RD. Take any F ∈ F and let ¦ ∈ N be an arbitrary agent index. Let γ ≡ (M, g) be an s-mechanism.
1. The necessity of Condition M * * s . Suppose that F is partially-honest implemented by γ ≡ (M, g) ∈ Γ SP . From Theorem 3, it follows that F satisfies Condition M 2. The sufficiency of Condition M * * s . Suppose that F satisfies M * * s . Then, for all (R, x) ∈ R n × X with x ∈ F (R), x ∈ Y . Let γ ≡ (M, g) be the mechanism defined in sub-section 3.1. For each`∈ N, the set of truthful messages is that defined in (2) . By construction, γ ∈ Γ SP . Suppose that R ∈ R n is the true state. The proof that F (R) ⊆ NA ¡ γ, < R ¢ for any H 0 ∈ H can be given similar to the corresponding part in the proof of Theorem 2, so we omit it here. Conversely, to show that
for this H, and let h be an arbitrary partially-honest agent in H. Let us consider the following cases.
Case 1 : m falls into Rule 1.
Then, m is consistent with x andR ∈ R n , where
, agent h can trigger the modulo game and choose an agent index k h so that`=` * (m
This reasoning is applied to any H ∈ H, thus Condition M * *
Then, m is m −i quasi-consistent with
We proceed accordingly the following sub-cases: 1) R 
) and x ∈ max R`Y for all`∈ N\ {i}. By the definition of g, m h ∈ T γ h (R, F ) for all h ∈ H; otherwise a contradiction can be obtained. Observe that if agent i is a partially-honest agent, it must be the case that R i−1 i 
, the same reasoning used above for sub-case 2.1 carries over into this sub-case, so that x ∈ F (R). Otherwise, let x ∈ F ¡R 0 ¢ . Then, there are two potential deviators, i − 1 and i. Agent`∈ N\ {i − 1, i} can attain any y ∈ Y \ {x} by inducing Rule 4, so that x ∈ max R`Y as m ∈ NE (γ, R). Consider agent i − 1. Take any y ∈ C i−1 Suppose that #Y > 2. Take any`∈ N\ {i}. Then, agent`can induce the modulo game by choosing any y ∈ Y \ {x, x i } and changing m`into m * = ¡R`, y, k`¢. To attain y, agent`has only to adjust k`by which` * (m * , m −`) =`. To attain x (resp., x i ), agenth as only to adjust k`by which` * (m * , m −`) = j for j ∈ N\ {`, i} (resp.,` * (m * , m −`) = i). Therefore, Y ⊆ g (M`, m −`) for any`∈ N\ {i}. Otherwise, let #Y = 2. Then, n > 3. Take any`∈ N\ {i}. Choosing x`= x i , agent`can make # ©`∈ N|x`= x ª ≥ 2 and # ©`∈ N|x`6 = x ª ≥ 2. As the outcome is determined by Rule 4, agent`can attain any outcome in Y by appropriately choosing k`. Therefore, Y ⊆ g (M`, m −`) for any`∈ N\ {i}. Sub-case 2.2. #Y = 2 and n = 3
Then, Y = {x, x i } and N = {i,`,`0}. Moreover, g (m) = x. Agent`can change her strategy m`to m * = ¡R`, Since m ∈ NE ¡ γ, < R ¢ , we have that
) and g (m) ∈ max R`Y for all`∈ N\ {i}. Moreover, by the definition of g, we have that m h ∈ T γ h (R, F ) for all h ∈ H; otherwise m ∈ NE ¡ g, < R ¢ cannot hold, a contradiction (details available from the authors). Suppose that #H > 1, Condition λ * * (ii.b) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R). Otherwise, let #H = 1. Suppose that H ⊆ N\ {i}. Again, Condition λ * * (ii.b) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R). Finally, let H = {i}. By following the same reasoning used in Case 3 of Theorem 2, it follows from RD, Condition λ * * (ii.a), and Condition λ * * (v) that g (m) ∈ F (R). for all`∈ N. From Theorem 2, it follows that F satisfies Conditions μ * * . Next, we show that F satisfies Condition μ2 * * (v). Pick any (x 0 , R 0 ) ∈ X × R 2 with x 0 ∈ F (R 0 ), and take any R * ∈ R 2 . Since x 0 ∈ F (R 0 ), it follows that there exists an m (R 0 , x 0 ) ∈ NE ¡ γ, < R 0 ¢ and g (m (R 0 , x 0 )) = x 0 , where m h (R 0 , x 0 ) ∈ T γ h (R 0 , F ). Let e ≡ e (x 0 , R 0 , x, R) = g (m 1 (R, x) , m 2 (R 0 , x 0 )). Then, defining C 1 (R 0 , x 0 ) ≡ g (M 1 , m 2 (R 0 , x 0 )) and C 2 (R, x) ≡ g (m 1 (R, x) , M 2 ), e ∈ C 1 (R 0 , x 0 )∩C 2 (R, x) holds. Thus, F satisfies μ2 * * (v.a). It is also clear that F meets Condition μ2 * * (v.c), since R = R 0 = R * implies that every agent is truthful and e is optimal at state R * . Finally, we check μ2 * * (v.b). Let x 6 = x 0 and R 6 = R 0 . Moreover, suppose that C 1 (R 0 , x 0 ) ⊆ L (R * 1 , e), C 2 (R, x) ⊆ L (R * 2 , e), and e / ∈ F (R * ). Suppose that R = R * . Assume, to the contrary, that H = {1}. Then, m 1 (R, x) ∈ T γ 1 (R * , F ). Since there cannot be any profitable deviation, we have that e ∈ NA ¡ γ, < R * ¢ for H = {1}, a contradiction. Thus, H = {2}. Similarly, we obtain H = {1} if R 0 = R * . In summary, F satisfies Condition μ2 * * (v).
2. The sufficiency of Condition μ2 * * . Suppose that F satisfies Condition μ2 * * . Then, F (R 2 ) ⊆ Y . For each`∈ N, define Mà s follows
where Z + is the set of nonnegative integers. The set of truthful messages is that defined in (1) . Define the outcome function g : M → X as follows: For all m ∈ M, for i, j ∈ N, with i 6 = j: The outcome e ≡ e (x 2 , R 2 , x 1 , R 1 ) is the outcome specified in Condition μ2 * * (v.a). Observe that γ ∈ Γ SP , by construction.
Suppose that R ∈ R 2 is the true state and take any H ∈ H. Let x ∈ F (R) and suppose that for all`∈ N, m`(R, x) = (R, x, x, 0) ∈ T γ (R, F ). Rule 1 implies that g (m) = x. By the definition of g, any deviation by agent`∈ N leads to an outcome in C`(R, x), so that g (M`, m i (R, x)) = C`(R, x), where i ∈ N\ {`}. Since C`(R, x) ⊆ L (R`, x), such deviations are not profitable. It follows that x ∈ NA ¡ γ, < Suppose that m falls into Rule 1. Then, g (m) = x 1 . By the definition of g, it follows that m h ∈ T γ h (R, F ). Then, x 1 = x 2 ∈ F (R).
Case 2: m corresponds to Rule 2. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. Then, g (m 1 , M 2 ) = Y ⊆ L (R 2 , g (m)) and g (m) ). By the definition of g, m h ∈ T γ h (R, F ). Suppose that H = {2}. Condition μ2 * * (ii.c) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R) as R 2 = R. Otherwise, let H = {1}. Following the same reasoning used in Case 3 of Theorem 2, it follows from RD, Condition μ2 * * (ii.a), and Condition μ2 * * (iv) that g (m) ∈ F (R).
Case 3: m corresponds to Rule 3. Then, C 1 (R 2 , x 2 ) = g (M 1 , m 2 (R 2 , x 2 )) ⊆ L (R 1 , g (m)) and C 2 (R 1 , F ) . If x 1 = x 2 , then g (m) ∈ F (R). Otherwise, let x 1 6 = x 2 . Suppose that R 1 = R 2 . Then, since F satisfies Condition μ2 * * , it follows that (g (m) , x 2 ) ∈ I 1 and (g (m) , x 1 ) ∈ I 2 . Condition μ2 * * (v.c) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R). Finally, let R 1 6 = R 2 . Suppose that H = {1}, so that R 1 = R. Condition μ2 * * (v.b.1) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R). Otherwise, let H = {2}, and so R 2 = R. Condition μ2 * * (v.b.2) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R). Proof of Theorem 10. Let Assumption 1 and RD hold. Take any F ∈ F defined on R 2 . Let γ ≡ (M, g) be a mechanism.
The necessity of Condition μ2
•• . Suppose that F is partially-honest implemented by γ ∈ Γ StP . From Theorem 8, Condition μ2 * * is satisfied. Furthermore, as it is clear that F satisfies Condition μ2 •• (vi), we conclude that F meets Condition μ2
The sufficiency of Condition μ2
•• . Suppose that F satisfies Condition μ2
•• . Then, F (R 2 ) ⊆ Y . Consider the mechanism γ constructed in Theorem 8. Clearly, γ ∈ Γ StP . Moreover, let the set of truthful messages be that defined in (1) .
Suppose that R ∈ R 2 is the true state and pick any H ∈ H. The proof that F (R) ⊆ NA ¡ γ, < R ¢ follows from Theorem 8. Then, to show that NA ¡ γ, < R ¢ ⊆ F (R) for this H, let m ∈ NE ¡ γ, < R ¢ for this H. As in Theorem 8, we have to consider several cases. The proof that g (m) ∈ F (R) follows from the same arguments used in Theorem 8 whenever Rule 1, Rule 3, Rule 4, or Rule 5 applies to m. Therefore, suppose that m falls into Rule 2. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. Then, g (m 1 , M 2 ) = Y ⊆ L (R 2 , g (m)) and g (m) ). By the definition of g, we have that m h ∈ T γ h (R, F ) for all h ∈ H. Suppose that #H = 1. Then, g (m) ∈ F (R) by Case 2 of Theorem 8. Suppose that #H = 2. Then, Condition μ2
•• (vi) implies that g (m) ∈ F (R), as sought.
